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oddly, God does not (and again we wonder what "genuine" means here, 
since God genuinely manages to produce them). So it seems that Hill has 
a problem no matter which way he goes. Some of these problems could be 
blunted were Hill able to show that necessarily, every maximally powerful 
being is also omnipotent, since he defines omnipotence roughly this way: x 
is omnipotent just if, for every state of affairs S, if S is in some possible being's 
DPC, S is in x's DPC (p. 169). Hill does not argue for this, and the problems 
just outlined are reasons to think that it can't be shown.
Reviewers should praise and not just bury; I'll say again that this is a 
book worth reading. Routledge should be encouraged to come out with a 
paper edition: the book's price is an outrage.2
NOTES
1. My thanks to Joseph Jedwab here.
2. My thanks to the author, correspondence with whom considerably im­
proved this review.
Rethinking the Ontological Argument: A Neoclassical Theistic Response, by 
Daniel A. Dombrowski. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. 
vii and 172. Cloth $70.00.
ANDREW NAM, Baylor University
As its title suggests, the book purports to defend Anselm's famous argu­
ment from a distinctly process philosophical perspective, namely that of 
Charles Hartshorne. The book's six chapters can be further reduced to four 
categories: (a) a historical survey of the argument (Plato's anticipation, 
Anselm's initial articulation, various versions and interpretations after 
Anselm, and Hume's critique), (b) a critique of the contemporary oppo­
nents in the non-analytic tradition (Richard Rorty and Mark Taylor), (c) 
a critique of the most prominent contemporary opponent in the analytic 
tradition (Graham Oppy), and finally (d) a criticism of classical theism. 
This book is, as one can see, more than just a philosophical examination 
of the validity and soundness of the argument itself. So, those readers 
who are solely interested in seeing an 'analytic' discussion of the argu­
ment will likely be disappointed, as is evident in William Lane Craig's 
searing review in Philosophia Christi (9:1). While sharing some of the dis­
appointment, which will be shown below, I wish to pay closer attention 
to Dombrowski's central claim throughout his work, that the ontological 
argument's cogency and merit—both philosophical and religious-logi- 
cally requires the neoclassical view of God.
Let us first examine Dombrowski's formulation of the argument and 
its defense against Oppy's critique, and secondly his criticism of classical 
theism. He sees two distinct versions of the argument in Anselm's Proslo- 
gion, one in chapter 2 and the other in chapter 3, favoring the latter as the 
stronger of the two. Although he questions its truth later, Dombrowski 
grants, for the sake of argument, that Kant's objection, 'Existence is not a
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predicate,' defuses the first version, while the second, the modal version, is 
immune to it because modality of existence can be unproblematically con­
sidered a predicate. The reasoning goes like this: since I have no discernible 
problem making sense of my contingent existence as a genuine attribute 
of my being, and necessary and contingent existence are symmetrically in­
terdependent with each other logically (one cannot be understood without 
the other), necessary existence must be a predicate. Dombrowski offers us 
his fellow process philosopher George Goodwin's (Hartshornean) formu­
lation of Anselm's second version as follows:
1. Modality of existence is a predicate.
2. The existence of God is either necessary or impossible (due to the 
logic of perfection).
3. The existence of God is possible (conclusion from other theistic ar­
guments, including the argument from religious experience).
4. The existence of God is necessary. (pp. 96-97)
The logic of perfection excludes contingent existence (Premise 2). Here I 
agree with Dombrowski that Premise 2 by itself constitutes a strikingly 
profound contribution of Anselm's argument, which asserts that a con­
tingently existing perfect being is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, a 
potential objection based on the Humean notion that all existence must be 
contingent is exposed for its question-begging nature, which Oppy him­
self has acknowledged: the ontological argument itself at least constitutes 
a challenge to this empiricist assumption, and if sound, a decisive refuta­
tion of it.
Shoring up the argument with modal categories as above, of course, 
does not avoid all problems. The most general problem according to Oppy 
is that the argument either begs the question or makes a logically illicit 
move. Even though Dombrowski considers several other objections, like 
the perfect island argument and Kant's objection, I shall discuss and eval­
uate only his treatment of the main objection posed by Oppy.
Oppy contends that the ontological arguer either begins the argument 
with the extensional concept of God (namely there is a member of the class 
'God') in the premise and concludes with the same extensional concept, 
which is to beg the question, or illicitly moves from the intensional sense 
of God (a mere definition) in the premise to the extensional sense in the 
conclusion. For Oppy, the latter horn of the dilemma is simply that from 
a mere abstract, universal characterization of God as necessarily existent, 
one cannot validly derive a conclusion about the concrete, particular exis­
tence of God. Dombrowski's central response to this problem is to appeal 
to the neoclassical theistic understanding of the relationship between the 
abstract and the concrete, or more specifically, the distinction between ex­
istence and actuality. In his own words, "God's existence, the fact that God 
exists, is an abstract constant; by way of contrast, God's actuality, or how 
God exists, is contingent and changes in concrete detail from moment to 
moment" (p. 100). The ontological argument, for neoclassical theists, does 
not conclude with a claim about a concrete existence of God, but rather, a
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purely abstract claim that God exists necessarily, which in turn entails an­
other abstract claim that some concrete state of God's existence is necessary. 
As long as the argument does not entail a claim about any specific way of 
existing, Dombrowski believes the argument is free of any illicit move.
This response, distinguishing existence from actuality and character­
izing existence as abstract and actuality as concrete, is bound to bewilder 
any typical reader without a prior commitment or inclination to process 
philosophy: How can existence and actuality be really distinct? Perhaps 
all of us can agree that necessary existence is an abstract property and 
likewise that perfect being is an abstract concept. But how can a claim 
about something's actual existence, namely the conclusion that God exists 
necessarily, which entails that God exists in this actual world, be abstract? 
There must be some confusion in the way Dombrowski uses the terms, 
abstract and concrete. The conclusion that God exists necessarily can be 
construed as abstract only in the sense that the proposition itself is an ab­
stract thing, likened to a Platonic form or universal that can be instantiated 
by a concrete particular—but the question of whether that proposition is 
instantiated in the world is a separate matter. However, the object of the 
proposition, what the proposition is about, is not an abstract entity, but 
rather, a concrete existing thing called "God."
Oppy's complaint is then precisely that the ontological arguer moves 
from the premise (a proposition), which is about an abstract object, in the 
beginning of the argument, i.e., the concept or the abstract property of 
necessary existence and the abstract concept of a perfect being, to the con­
clusion (another proposition), which is about a concrete object, in the end, 
i.e., God's necessary existence, not as an abstract concept, but as referring 
to a really existing entity in this world. It seems to me that Dombrowski's 
foregoing confusion ultimately stems from being unable to recognize a cer­
tain incommensurability between the abstract and the concrete, between our 
thought world and the actual world, which lies at the root of the problem 
that prevents Anselm's argument from being convincing to all. I can only 
conjecture that it is Dombrowski's idealistic bent—which no doubt is inher­
ent in process philosophy, the tradition that received its influence from Ger­
man Idealism and ultimately from Plato himself—that led him to overlook 
the entrenched incommensurability between the abstract and the concrete, 
and create an ad hoc distinction between existence and actuality.
Dombrowski's misunderstanding continues when he says that "the 
necessary existence of God demonstrated in the argument is not meant 
to show any particular feature of the world, . . . but only a purely general 
status of any possible world, viz., that it be deified" (p. 104). The general 
status of possible worlds including our own, supposedly demonstrated by 
the ontological argument, precisely entails the particular feature that the 
perfect being exists in this world. Dombrowski, however, emphasizes again 
and again that "in neoclassical theism[,] God's existence is not particular, 
although God's actuality is" (p. 104). But this view of existence flies in the 
face of how we normally experience existence in the actual world, namely, 
that existence is irreducibly particular—though  not purely particular. (Note 
further that I do not assume that affirming the particularity/concreteness 
of existence must always mean contingency.) And therein lies one of the 
lessons to be learned from Kant's famous objection that existence is not a
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predicate; it is not some purely abstract property like the mathematical 
object 'oneness,' which cannot be said to exist in this world. In my summa­
tion, therefore, Dombrowski's neoclassical theistic distinction of existence 
and actuality is an inadequate answer to Oppy's major objection.
Dombrowski's main criticism of classical theism and thus his defense of 
neoclassical theism are found in the last chapter. The central question there 
is: Which theistic model is more consistent with the idea of perfection in 
the ontological argument? Classical theistic philosophers and theologians, 
especially of the Christian tradition in the West, have exerted much effort 
to make their conception of God as a perfect being coherent. Dombrowski 
invokes such familiar problems as the problem of evil, of foreknowledge 
and freedom, of an eternal God's relation to the temporal world, and the 
list goes on. Dombrowski happily points to the contemporary classical 
theistic philosophers and theologians, like Thomas Morris and the Open 
Theists, who, in his estimate, make certain concessions to process philoso­
phy when faced with the arduous task of reconciling the far removed and 
static Unmoved Mover with the dynamic God of the Bible. Dombrowski 
dismisses the Thomistic distinction between real and relational change as 
philosophically vacuous. Furthermore, classical theism fails to uphold the 
religious significance of the ontological argument because it encourages 
a type of dualism that places religious thinking and religious experience 
into two separate spheres.
It would be a mistake, Dombrowski argues, to think that the ever- 
changing, temporal, and dependent God of process philosophy is unfit 
for the title of the greatest conceivable being (p. 143). Then which God is 
the perfect one? This question is admittedly not easy to settle. However, 
it is appropriate to challenge Dombrowski's and the common disdain for 
the Deity of classical theism. I believe the God of classical theism is epis- 
temically more natural and intuitive to us, and religiously more powerful 
and satisfying than the process theologian's God. Because we are person­
ally aware of our deep limitation that comes from our changing, temporal 
existence, it is natural to find ourselves with an intuition about a perfect 
being that is without such limitations. Our absolute dependence on God 
(i.e., faith) requires on the flip side an absolutely independent God. Our 
recognition of God's absolute self-sufficiency makes grace intelligible and 
experienceable, for creation itself is God's free gift and God's loving us 
and calling us to His service, when He does not need us at all, is utterly 
gratuitous. Furthermore, if the life of faith can be recognized as a passion­
ate pursuit of and search for God, the transcendent God is more likely to 
inspire such passion than the immanent God, 'the World Soul.' (In my 
view neoclassical theism merely pays lip service to God's transcendence.) 
It is no accident then that the most fascinating philosophical argument in 
history is found in the middle of a pathos-filled prayer by Anselm, a saint 
and a paragon of classical theism:
What shall he do, most high Lord, what shall this exile do, far away
from You as he is? What shall Your servant do, tormented by love of
You and yet cast off 'far from Your face'? He yearns to see You and
Your countenance is too far away from him. He desires to come close
to You, and Your dwelling place is inaccessible. (Proslogion, chapter 1)
